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PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES: A NEW FRONTIER
I. INTRODUCTION
During its 1978 regular session, the Virginia General Assembly contin-
ued its efforts to regulate prepaid legal services. Enacted was a bill de-
signed to regulate certain legal services plans not covered by Virginia or
federal statute.'
Virginia law has regulated legal services insurance, or indemnification
for legal expenses, as any other form of insurance since 1976.2 The new law
will allow plans which provide services, as opposed to indemnity, to organ-
ize under a less stringent system modeled after the Blue Cross-Blue Shield
approach.3 The General Assembly rejected the approach of the Model Act
proposed by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. That
scheme includes both indemnity and service contracts in its definition of
legal services insurance, both of which are subjected to less stringent con-
trols than other insurance. Only one state has adopted the Model Act.,
1. An Act of Assembly of March 9, 1976, 1976 Va. Acts c.658 (codified in VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 38.1-22.1, 38.1-790 to -809, 58-490 (Cum. Supp. 1978)), hereinafter referred to as the Act.
The bill was sponsored by Senator J. Harry Michael of Charlottesville, Virginia. Regulation
under the new law will be through the State Corporation Commission and the Insurance
Commissioner.
2. Legal services insurance, regulated under VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-389.4 (Repl. Vol. 1976),
is defined in 38.1-22.1 (Cum. Supp. 1978) as:
. . . the assumption of a contractual obligation to reimburse the insured against, or
pay on behalf of the insured, all or a portion of his fees, costs, and expenses related to
or arising out'of service performed by or under the supervision of an attorney licensed
to practice in the jurisdiction where in said services are performed.
3. Legal services plan is defined in VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-791(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978) as:
* * . the assumption of a contractual obligation or an arrangement, whereby legal
services are provided in consideration of a specified payment regardless of whether
such payment is made by the subscribers individually or by a third person for them.
The provisions on contracts for future hospitalization and medical and related services are
found in VA. CODE ANN. § 32-195.1 et seq. (Rep. Vol. 1973). These provisions originally came
into the Virginia law as an Act of Assembly of March 16, 1940, 1940 Va. Acts c. 230, and have
been amended and recodified into their present form.
Legal services plans will encompass both group and individual contracts as has been said
is the case with medical service plans. 1975 VA. ATr'y GEN. Op. 314.
4. N.A.I.C. Prepaid Legal Expense Insurance Model Act (adopted in 1974) printed in 2
OFFICIAL N.A.I.C. MODEL INSURANCE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 680-1, -13 & -14
(1977) [hereinafter cited as the MODEL ACT].
Although the MODEL ACT was not adopted, several portions of it concerning the purposes
and scope of the law were adapted to the Virginia Act. The state adopting the MODEL ACT
was Arkansas.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
I. PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
Among the stated purposes of the Act are: to encourage development of
effective and economic ways of providing legal services and to ease the
financial burden on the consumer;' to provide a flexible regulatory frame-
work for experimentation with new forms of delivery systems;6 and to place
the risk of such experimentation on promoters rather than the consumer.'
The Act allows any group of attorneys or any person or group of persons
to conduct a legal services plan either directly or through an agent., Partic-
ipants are to be jointly and severally liable on all contracts made on behalf
of the plan.' As a condition to licensing, a plan must demonstrate ability
to meet its obligations to all subscribers based on its financial condition
and method of doing business. 0
Explicitly excluded from regulation are retainer contracts;" referral
services;' 2 plans providing for limited benefits on simple matters in the
context of an employment, educational, or similar relationship and not
involving a legally binding promise;' 3 services provided by employee organ-
izations in matters relating to employment;' 4 services provided by any
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-790(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: MODEL ACT §§ 1 (1) & (2), note
4 supra.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-790(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: MozL ACT § 1 (2), note 4
supra.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-790(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: MODEL ACT § 1 (3), note 4
supra.
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.1-792 & -793 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: Id. 32-195.2 (Repl. Vol.
1973) & -195.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 1978). The provision for non-stock corporate operation appear-
ing in the source sections does not appear in the Act.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-794 (Cum. Supp. 1978). The section also provides that a contract
executed by the agent alone is binding upon the principals, that an action on such a contract
may be brought by naming the agent as the sole defendant, and that ". . . a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff may be satisfied out of the assets of the plan in the custody of the agent
or out of the asset of each and all of the principals." Source: Id. § 32-195.4 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
It is also provided that any participating person or attorney may resign from the plan and
remain liable on any subscription contract while effective, but not beyond the current con-
tract years. Id. § 38.1-795 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Persons and attorneys may be admitted to
participation in a plan at any time and will automatically become liable on all outstanding
contracts. Id. Source: Id. § 32-195.5 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
10. Id. § 38.1-802 (Cum. Supp. 1978). The source is Id. § 32-195.11 (Repl. Vol. 1973), but
that section does not contain the requirement set out in the text.
11. Id. § 38.1-802 (1) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: MODEL ACT § 2 (4) (b) (i), note 4 supra.
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-802 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: MODEL ACT § 2 (4) (b) (ii),
note 4 supra.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-802 (3) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: MODEL ACT § 2 (4) (b) (iii),
note 4 supra. This section exempts a university, for example, that employs an attorney to
advise students as the need arises.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-802 (4) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: MODEL ACT § 2 (4) (b) (iv),
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government agency to its employees;1" legal services insurance;' 6 and the
furnishing of legal assistance by "organizations or organizations of employ-
ees" where the organization contracts directly with the attorney for the
provision of legal services."
The Act makes various provisions of the insurance title of the Virginia
Code applicable to legal services plans, including the unfair trade practices
and antitrust provisions.' 8 Plans are prohibited from making payments to
subscribers except for damages due to breach of contract or for compensa-
tion if services are rendered by a nonparticipating attorney.,' Plans are also
prohibited from using any misleading advertising matter, subscription
applications, or contracts-whether written or oral.21
The Act creates a regulatory framework which includes reporting2 ' and
disclosure provisions.2 If a plan is operated in corporate form by a group
note 4 supra. This has been characterized as the "typical union lawyer arrangement." April
1978 VA. B. NEws at 22.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-802 (5) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: MODEL Acr § 2 (4) (b) (v),
note 4 supra.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-802 (6) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: New. See note 2 supra, for
the definition of legal services insurance.
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-802 (7) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: New. There are said to be
approximately twelve union plans with the direct retainer contract feature operating in Vir-
ginia at present. April 1978 VA. B. NEws at 23.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-798 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: Id. § 32-195.8 (Cum. Supp.
1978). The unfair trade practices and antitrust provisions are codified in Id. §§ 38.1-49 to -62
(Repl. Vol. 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978). The Act also makes the following sections of title 38.1
applicable to legal services plans: the general powers of the SCC to regulate insurance (§ 38.1-
29 (Repl. Vol. 1976)); provisions requiring SCC approval for management and exclusive
agency contracts (§ 38.1-29.1 (Repl. Vol. 1976)); provisions relating to assessments for admin-
istration of insurance laws (§§ 38.1-44 to -48 (Repl. Vol. 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978)); the
Unauthorized Insurers Process Act (§§ 38.1-63 to -70 (Repl. Vol. 1976)); provisions relating
to refusal, suspension or revocation of licenses (§§ 38.1-99 to -104 (Repl. Vol. 1976)); provi-
sions pertaining to annual statements and other repprts (§§ 38.1-159 to -165 (Repl. Vol.
1976)); provisions on examination (§§ 38.1-174 to -178 (Repl. Vol. 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978));
and the requirement that policy forms be filed with and approved by the SCC (§ 38.1-342.1
(Cui. Supp. 1978)). Also made applicable to the plans were sections of title 58 levying a
license tax on (§ 58-490 (Cum. Supp. 1978)) and requiring declarations of estimated income
tax by insurance companies (§ 58-502.1 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1974)).
19. Id. § 38.1-798 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: Id. § 32-195.8 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
20. Id. § 38.1-805 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: Id. § 32-195.16 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
21. Id. § 38.1-799 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: Id. § 32-195.8:1 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
22. Id. § 38.1-801 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: Id. § 32-195.8:3 (Repl. Vol. 1973). There are
provisions on licensing of plans and salesmen, Id. §§ 38.1-802 to -804 (Cum. Supp. 1978),
powers of the State Corporation Commission, Id. §§ 38.1-806 & -807, and appeals from the
SCC to the Virgnia Supreme Court, Id. § 38.1-808. The jurisdiction of the SCC does not
extend to controversies growing out of subscription contracts. Id. § 38.1-809. Source: Id. §
32-195.20 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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of attorneys, a majority of the board of directors must be providers of legal
services." If the corporation is operated by other than a group of attorneys,
then a majority of the board of directors must be subscribers who are not
providers of legal services or employees or officers of the plan.24 In addition,
the subscriber must be afforded free choice of the attorneys available and
participating in the plan."
IM. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE ETHICS CODE
The growth of prepaid legal services was stipulated in the 1960's by three
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. In NAACP v. Button,"5 the
NAACP was held entitled to an injunction restraining enforcement of Vir-
ginia's unlawful solicitation statute prohibiting acceptance of employment
from anyone not a party to, or who had no pecuniary right or liability in,
a judicial proceeding.Y Thus, a nonprofit organization, which did not have
as its primary purpose the furnishing of legal services, could under first
amendment freedom of association principles, select and compensate
counsel to bring suits for individuals challenging racial discrimination in
violation of their federal constitutional rights.,
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia,9 the Court held that
the Virginia State Bar could not condemn, as unauthorized practice or
unlawful solicitation, the BRT's plan in which members and their families
were assisted by union counsel in finding an attorney in certain work-
related accident cases.3 0
Finally, in United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar Association,31 it was held
that the UMW's retaining of an attorney to bring workmen's compensation
cases could not be enjoined as unauthorized practice of law.32
23. Id. § 38.1-797 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: Id. § 32-195.5:2 (Cum. Sup. 1978).
24. Id. § 38.1-796 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: Id. § 32-195.5:1 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
25. Id. § 38.1-800 (Cum. Supp. 1978). Source: Id. § 32-195.8:2 (Repl. Vol. 1973). See notes
54-71 & 98-112, infra, and corresponding text. The definition of legal services insurance was
also amended to eliminate the requirement that the attorney be selected "solely by said
insured." VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-22.1 (Cum. Supp. 1978). See note 2 supra.
26. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
27. Wilcox & Schneider, Prepaid Legal Services and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 765-66 (1975); [hereinafter cited as Wn.cox &
SCHNImER]; Emmons, United States ex parte Group Legal Plans v. Code of Professional
Responsibility: Have Ethical Considerations Finally Won Over the Disciplinary Rules?, 44
INS. COUNSEL J. 248, 249 (1977); [hereinafter cited as EMMONS]. As Mr. Emmons notes, many
articles touching this subject have summaries of these cases. Id. at n. 16.
28. WiLcox & ScHNEmEnR, note 27 supra, at 765-66; EMMONS, note 27 supra, at 249.
29. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
30. WILcox & SCHNEmER, note 27 supra, at 766; EMMONS, note 27 supra, at 249.
31. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
32. WiLcox & ScHNEmER, note 27 supra, at 766-67; EMMONS, note 27 supra, at 249.
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Throughout this line of cases, the Court recognized that the state does
have a legitimate interest in regulating the practice of law. However, this
interest must be balanced against first amendment principles, for the
state, ". . apparently cannot prohibit the right (of a group) to organize
with respect to providing legal services to its members by claiming that
the client's interest might be sacrificed or that the profession might be
injured. ' '" A definite injury must be shown."
The response of the national bar to these cases came in 1969 with the
adoption by the American Bar Association of its Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. The Disciplinary Rules provided that an attorney could assist
only those legal services organizations which were nonprofit and whose
primary purpose did not include rendering legal services. Furthermore, the
rules required that the organization receive no financial benefit from the
rendering of services which were required to be incident to the organiza-
tion's primary purpose. The ABA made its position perfectly clear when
it provided that an attorney could assist such an organization "...only
in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional inter-
pretation at the time of the rendition of the services requires the allowance
of such legal service activity ... "31
The Virginia State Bar supported this narrow reading of the previously
discussed cases and recommended adoption of the rule." The rule was
adopted in 1970 by the Virginia Supreme Court in the same form as origi-
nally promulgated by the ABA."
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court decided United Transporta-
tion Union v. State Bar of Michigan.39 As in BRT, the activity sought to
be prohibited involved recommending attorneys to members and their
families." In UTU, however, the union had agreements with the attorneys
regarding maximum fees.41 In reversing the Michigan Supreme Court, Mr.
33. WiLcox & ScHNmER, note 27 supra, at 767 (emphasis in original).
34. Id.
35. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RSPONSImmY D.R. 2-103 (D) (4) (1969) [hereinafter cited
as 1969 ABA D.R.].
36. Id.
37. Report of Committee on Group Legal Services, May 1970 VA. B. NEws at 8.
38. Order amending VA. Supp. CT. R. 6:11, 211 Va. 295 (1970). The order repealed the
Cannons of Professional Ethics and substituted the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
particular rule in quesion became VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:11hD.R. 2-103 (D) (5), 211 Va. 295, 310-
11 (1970), [hereinafter cited as 1970 VA. D.R.].
39. 401 U.S. 576 (1971)..
40. See notes 29 & 30, supra.
41. WILcox & ScHNEiDER, note 27 supra, at 767; EmmONS, note 27 supra at 249.
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Justice Black, speaking for the Court, noted that the earlier case had been
read too restrictively." He then addressed the scope of the evolving right:
The principal here involved cannot be limited to the facts of this case. At
issue is the basic right to group legal action. . . .The common thread run-
ning through our decisions (in the earlier cases) is that collective activity
undertaken to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right
within the protection of the First Amemdment. However, the right would be
a hollow promise if courts could deny associations of workers or others the
means of enabling their members to meet the costs of legal representation.43
It became apparent that the Supreme Court was balancing the interest
of the public against that of the profession." In other words, the public has
a fundamental right under the first amendment to organize in meeting the
cost of legal assistance. 5 To burden this right, the state must show a"substantial regulatory interest"46 or a "substantive evil" endangering pro-
fessional standards. 7 The state interest must be compelling 8 and not
merely theoretical or imaginable."
United Transportation Union generated discussion in the Virginia State
Bar." The Bar recommended that the Disciplinary Rules be amended to
allow attorney participation in prepaid legal services plans and to provide
adequate safeguards for both the public and the Bar.5 It also recom-
mended that the Bar takes steps to sponsor an open panel plan.12 Accord-
ingly, an amendment was offered and approved.5 3
42. UTU v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 579-80 (1971).
43. Id. at 585-586.
44. WILcox & SCHNEIDER, note 27 supra, at 768; EMMONS, note 27 supra, at 249-50.
45. See note 43, supra.
46. EMMONS, note 27 supra, at 250.
47. WILcox & ScHNEIDER, note 27 supra, at 768.
48. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963).
49. EMMONS, note 27 supra, at 450. See text corresponding to note 33, supra.
50. See, Howard W. Dobbins, Prepaid Legal Services: Developments and Proposals, Nov.-
Dec. 1972 VA. B. NEws at 15. Mr. Dobbins, then Chairman of the Virginia State Bar Prepaid
Legal Services Committee, noted that the Bar was not participating in this rapidly expanding
area. Id. at 15-16. He went on to summarize the Supreme Court cases with particular empha-
sis on the language of Mr. Justice Black (see text corresponding to note 43, supra). Id. at 18.
He noted that prepaid legal services plans would tap a previously unserved group of potential
clients and posed the question why legal services plans should be regulated differently than
medical services plans. Id. at 19.
51. Report of Committee on Prepaid Legal Services, May-June 1973 VA. B. NEws at 27.
52. Id.
53. The proposed amendment to VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:II:D.R. 2-103 (D) was printed in Nov.-
Dec. 1973 VA. B. NEws at 16. The amendment was adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court
(Order amending VA. Sup. CT. R. 6:11:D.R. 2-103 (D), 215 Va. 246 (1974)) with minor changes
supported by both the Virginia State Bar and the Virginia Bar Association. Report of the
Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Jan. 1975 VA. B.AJ. at 35. The
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The amendment deleted the "controlling constitutional interpretation"
language from the 1970 version, and substituted a requirement that the
organization be collectively established." It further provided that the or-
ganization may derive a financial benefit if the lawyer renders services to
the organization as a whole. 5 Also, the emphasis on the attorney maintain-
ing his independent judgement was strengthened. 6
In addition to modifying the existing rule, a second class of plans was
created in which attorneys would be allowed to participate. 7 Under this
rule, an attorney could assist any open panel plan which did not derive a
profit except an actuarial one derived from the overall operation of the
plan.58
Meanwhile, the ABA had adopted the Houston Amendments to the rules
regulating legal services plans."5 While authorizing both open and closed
panels, the effect of these amendments was to restrict closed panels in
favor of open panels."5 Like the previous rule, a closed panel had to be non-
profit and could not have the provision of legal services as one of its pri-
mary purposes.6 ' The amendments were criticized for unduly restricting
closed panels in the dissemination and cost of services.62 The closed panel
entire rules of the Virginia Supreme Court are printed in 216 Va. 941 (1976). The amended
portions of the rule are hereinafter cited as 1974 VA. D.R.
54. 1974 VA. D.R. 2-103 (D) (5), n. 5 supra. See, notes 35-38, supra, and corresponding text.
55. 1974 VA. D.R. 2-103 (D) (5) (c).
56. Id. at 2-103 (D) (5) (c) & (d). There are reporting and disclosure provisions applicable
to the plan. Id. at 2-103 (D) (5) (g) & (e). The participating attorney must file an affidavit of
compliance with these rules in the office of the Executive Director of the Virginia State Bar.
Id. at 2-103 (D) (5) ().
In addition, there are anti-solicitation and anti-publicity provisions applicable to the par-
ticipating attorney. Id. at 2-103 (D) (5) (i) & (f).
Plans are also prohibited from using subscribers' contributions for purposes other than
providing legal services and from allowing unlicensed persons to practice law. Id. at 2-103 (D)
(5) (c) & (h).
57. Id. at 2-103 (D) (6).
58. Id. at 2-103 (D) (6) & (D) (6) (b). This provision has rules similar to those in 1974 VA.
D.R. 2-103 (D) (5), note 56 supra, on the maintenance of independent professional judgment,
disclosure, reporting, anti-solicitation, anti-publicity, and unauthorized practice. Id. at 2-103
(D) (6) (a) & (c)-(g).
59. Young, House of Delegates Acts on Group Legal Services, Shield Legislation, Court
Organization Standards, and Uniform Divorce, 60 A.B.A.J. 446 (1974). The pertinent changes
to D.R. 2-103 (D) appear in this article. Id. at 448 [hereinafter cited as 1974 ABA D.R.].
60. Id.; Note, Prepaid Legal Services, Ethical Codes, and the Snares of Antitrust, 26
SYRACUSE L. REV. 754, 758 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SYRACUSE NOTE]; WILCOX &
SCHNEIDER, note 27 supra, at 772-73.
61. 1974 ABA D.R. 2-103 (D) (5) (a) (i)-(iii), note 59 supra. See notes 35-38, supra, and
corresponding text.
62. Remarks of Thomas E. Kauper, Ass't. Att'y Gen., Anti-Trust Division to the National
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concept was severely limited by a provision requiring that the subscriber
have the free choice of any attorney outside the plan and that the plan
reimburse the subscriber for the use of such an attorney. 3 These restric-
tions on closed panel plans were assailed as anticompetitive practices" and
as unconstitutional restraints on first amendment rights." This debate led
to a subsequent revision of the rules when the Chicago Amendments were
adopted in 1975.6
Under the Chicago Amendments, the organization may be either profit
or non-profit, provided that if it is organized for profit, ". . . services may
not be rendered by lawyers employed, directed, supervised or selected by
it. . .. -" The provision providing that the primary purposes of the organ-
ization could not include the provision of legal services was eliminated.6
A plan may not be organized for the primary purpose of providing finan-
cial, or other, benefits to the lawyer, and may not be operated to procure
clients for the lawyer outside of the service plan. 9
Additionally, the amendments provide that the member or beneficiary
may choose counsel other than that furnished, selected, or approved by the
plan, but the mandatory reimbursement provision was dropped."6 In its
stead is a provision requiring that the plan provide appropriate relief for
claims that representation by counsel (which the plan has furnished, se-
Conference of Bar Presidents, reprinted in Justice Department Continues its Contentions
that the Houston Amendments Raise Serious Antitrust Problems, 60 A.B.A.J. 1410, 1411
(1974) [hereinafter cited as ANTrrRUST PROBLEMS].
63. 1974 ABA D.R. 2-103 (D) (5) (a) (v), note 59 supra. The "prevailing constitutional
interpretation" language of 1969 ABA D.R. 2-103 (d) (4), note 35, supra, was retained in 1974
ABA D.R. 2-103 (D) (5) (a) (ix), note 59, supra, as an exception to the rule stated in the text.
See note 36, supra, and accompanying text.
64. Justice Department and Other Views on Prepaid Legal Services Plans Get an Airing
Before the Tunney Subcommittee, 60 A.B.A.J. 791 (1974) (Remarks of Bruce B. Wilson,
Deputy Ass't. Att'y Gen., Anti-Trust Division) [hereinafter cited as TUNNEY SUBcoMMrrrzE];
ANTrrRusT PROBLEMS note 62 supra. See notes 98-118, infra, and accompanying text.
65. TUNNEY SuBcoMmrrrEE, note 64 supra (Remarks of F. William McCalpin, a former
Chairman of the ABA Committee on Prepaid Legal Services).
66. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY D.R. 2-103 (D) (4) (1975), hereinafter cited
as 1975 ABA D.R. For a more detailed treatment of the shift from the 1974 version to the
1975 version, see Comment, Group Legal Services: From Houston to Chicago, 79 DICKINSON
L. REV. 621 (1975).
67. 1975 ABA D.R. 2-103 (D) (4) (a), note 66 supra. An exception to this rule is made where
the ultimate liability is on the organization such as insurers defending insureds on liability
claims. Id.; EMMONS, note 47 supra, at 252.
68. 1975 ABA D.R. 2-103 (D) (4), note 66 supra. See notes 35 & 61, supra, and correspond-
ing text.
69. 1975 ABA D.R. 2-103 (D) (4) (b) & (4) (c), note 66 supra.
70. Id. at D.R. 2-103 (D) (4) (e).
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lected, or approved) would be unethical, improper, or inadequate under
the circumstances2'
IV. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Congress has also enacted legislation designed to spur development of
legal services plans. In 1973, the Taft-Hartley Act was amended to allow
unions to negotiate directly with employers for legal services plans as fringe
benefits. 72 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 was also 'modified to offer
employers a deduction for contributions to qualified plans,7 3 to exclude
both plan-payed benefits and employer contributions from employee gross
income;7 and to give the trust funds of such plans tax-exempt status." The
17.5 million dollar United Auto Workers-Chrysler Corporation closed panel
plan was recently the first plan approved by the Internal Revenue Service
under the new law.7
Further congressional initiative is seen in the Employment Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974," which governs "employee benefit plans"
established or maintained by any employer, employee organization, or by
both. "Employee benefit plan" includes "employee welfare benefit
plans," 79 which are programs providing, through the purchase of insurance
or otherwise, prepaid legal services among other benefits."
ERISA provides that it supersedes any and all state laws as they relate
71. Id. See note 63, supra, and accompanying text.
72. 29 U.S.C.A. 186 (c) (8) (1965-75 Pamph. Supp.); EPMONS n. 2, supra, at 250; Bartosic
& Bernstein, Group Legal Services as a Fringe Benefit: Lawyers for Forgotten Clients
Through Collective Bargaining, 59 VA. L. REv. 410, 444-49 (1973).
Under these amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, the group is free to decide whether it
wants an open or closed panel. Bernstein & DeMent, Recent Developments in Prepaid Legal
Services, 34 FED. B. J. 72 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BRNsCmIN & DEMENT].
73. I.R.C. § 162 (a); Tress. Reg. § 1.162-10.
74. I.R.C. § 120.
75. I.R.C. § 501 (c) (20). Such plans will be governed by ERISA. EMMONS, n. 2 supra, at
250. See notes 77-92, infra.
On the tax aspects of legal services plans, see Hall, Operation of Group Legal Services Plans
Not Clear: Additional Guidelines Needed, 46 J. TAx. 108 (1977); Comment, Tax Policies in
Relation to Non-Business Legal Expenses and Prepaid Legal Services: The Inequities of New
Sections 120 & 501 (c) (20) of the I.R. C. and a Call for a Deduction of All Nonbusiness Legal
Expenses, 26 AM. U. L. Rnv. 451 (1977).
76. May 1978 Juits DocToR at 10. Unions favor closed panel plans because of their earlier
experience with costly and inefficient open panel medical services plans. Id.; BERNSTEIN &
DEMENT, note 72 supra.
77. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. (1975).
78. Id. § 1003 (a).
79. Id. § 1002 (3).
80. Id. § 1002 (1).
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to employee benefit plans.8 ' However, the supersedure provision is not to
be construed as to exempt any person from compliance with state insur-
ance laws,12 provided that neither an employee benefit plan nor any trust
established under such a plan shall be deemed to be an insurer for the
purposes of state insurance laws.3 It has been noted that this "'proviso'
to a 'proviso'" situation makes for ambiguity. 4
Not only is the supersedure provision unclear once it'is determined that
ERISA applies, but rules promulgated by the Department of Labor add
further ambiguity by providing for both limited and total exemption from
ERISA's provisions.8 5
Small plans can be exempted from most of the reporting requirements
of ERISA in several situations. The first is a welfare benefit plan that has
fewer than one hundred participants during a plan year and in which
benefits are paid as needed solely from the general assets of the employer
or. employee organization maintaining the plan. This is also true when the
benefits are provided exclusively through insurance contracts or policies if
the premiums are paid directly by the employer or employee organization
from general assets, or partly from general assets and partly from contribu-
tions by employees or members. 8
81. Id. § 1144 (a).
82. Id. § 1144 (b) (2) (A).
83. Id. § 1144 (b) (2) (B).
84. Brummond, The Legal Status of Uninsured, Noncollectively-Bargained Multiple
Employer Welfare Trusts Under ERISA and State Insurance Laws, 28 SYRACUSE L. Rxv. 701,
724 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BRUMMOND].
The scope of ERISA's supersedure provisions cannot be resolved in the space allocated for
this comment, however, a Court of Appeals decision holding that ERISA does not preempt
the application of state law to group insurance policies purchased by an employee benefit plan
where the question was regulating the content of the policies and not subjecting the plan to
regulation as an insurer is now pending before the United States Supreme Court. Wadsworth
v. Whaland, 562 F. 2d 70 (1st Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3403 (U.S. Nov.
29, 1977) (No. 77-765).
It has also been held that laws regulating services plans apart from traditional insurance
regulation, as is the case with the new Virginia Act, are laws regulating insurance within the
meaning of ERISA (29 U.S.C.A. § 1144 (b) (2) (A) (1975)). Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes,
425 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (California Health Care Plan Act).
85. See, Bowers, ERISA and Its Exceptions, 27 BAYLOR L. Rzv. 475 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as BowEls]. For the general effect of and problems created by ERISA, see Pfenningstorf
& Kimball, Employee Legal Service Plans: Conflicts Between Federal and State Regulation,
1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RES. J. 787; Comment, The Effect of ERISA on Prepaid Legal
Services, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 566 (1975).
86. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-20 (1977); BowERs, note 85 supra, at 476-77. Ths exemption is
available where the benefits are provided by a combination of both the direct payment and
insurance alternatives described in the text. Id. See cited sources for the particular provisions
to which the exemption applies, for additional requirements for obtaining the exemption, and
for examples.
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A second limited exemption from certain reporting and disclosure re-
quirements is available to group insurance plans of two or more unaffi-
liated employers having fewer than one hundred participants and which
are not multi-employer plans, meaning principally plans which are not
collectively bargained between one employee organization and more than
one employer.9 It is the exemption for multiple-employer benefit trusts
that provided the immediate impetus to the recent Virginia Act.,
Also exempt from the reporting and disclosure provisions of ERISA are
unfunded or insured welfare plans maintained by an employer for the
purpose of providing benefits for a select group of management or highly
compensated employees. 9
There are also a number of complete or total exemptions from ERISA.
A plan is not an employee welfare benefit plan if it is a group or group-
type insurance program offered by an insurer to employees or members of
an employee organization where there is little or no participation by the
employer or employee organization."
Also, the sole proprietor of an unincorporated trade or business and his
spouse, and a partner in a partnership are not considered to be employees."
87. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-21 (1977); BOWERS, note 85 supra, at 477. For the definition of
multi-employer plan, see 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (37) (1975).
To obtain the exemption, the plan must be fully insured through insurance contracts
purchased by the employers and/or by their participating employees, have benefit payments
made by the insurance company, and use a trust (or other entity such as a trade association)
as the legal owner of the insurance contracts and the conduit for payment of premiums to
the insurance company. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-21 (1977); BowERs, note 85 supra, at 477-78.
See cited sources for the particular provisions to which the exemption applies, for additional
requirements for obtaining the exemption, and for examples.
On the current status of certain multiple-employer welfare trusts, see BEUMMOND, note 84
supra.
88. See remarks of W.H.C. Venable, Chairman of the Virginia State Bar Prepaid Legal
Services Committee, printed in April 1978 VA. B. NEWS at 22. Mr. Venable noted that as a
number of these trusts have failed nationally and that since the federal regulations do not
apply, the consumer is left unprotected. Id. See also, BRUMMOND, note 84 supra.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-24 (1977); BoWERS, note 85 supra, at 478-79. To qualify, benefits
must be paid as needed solely from the general assets of the employer; benefits are provided
exclusively through insurance contracts or policies, the premiums for which are paid directly
by the employer from its general assets, issued by an insurance company or similar organiza-
tion; or both. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-24 (c) (1977); BowERs, note 85 supra, at 479.
90. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1 (j) (1977); BowEns, note 85 supra, at 478. No contributions can
be made by an employer or an employee organization. Participation must be completely
voluntary. The sole functions of the employer or employee organization must be limited to
permitting the program to be publicized to employees or members, and collecting premiums
and remitting them to the insurer. Finally, the employer or employee organization can receive
no consideration other than compensation for administrative services.
91. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (6) (1975); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3 (c) (1977); BowERs, note 85 supra,
at 479.
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Thus plans covering such persons are not employee benefit plans.92
The Virginia Act covers those plans which are thus exempt from the
supersedure provisions of ERISA and which are not regulated under Vir-
ginia law as insurance."
V. CONCLUSION
While prepaid legal services have received encouragement from recent
decisions, statutes, and rules of court, there has been some lack of clarity
as to how these new laws fit together, and more particularly, how they
affect the preexisting legal framework. Perhaps the primary area of confu-
sion has been the applicability of the antitrust laws to prepaid legal serv-
ices and to the legal profession generally.'
At the time of the Houston Amendments to the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility," the Justice Department made it clear that any
attempt to discriminate against closed panel plans by adoption of the
amendments would be prosecuted as a combination in restraint of trade.
Thus the Chicago Amendments were adopted. Since that time, however,
the status of the organized bar as defendant in an antitrust action has been
further defined by two much discussed Supreme Court decisions involving
related conflicts between Canon II and the first amendment and/or the
antitrust laws.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,9" the minimum fee schedule there
involved was held to constitute pricefixing 9  Any "learned professions"
exemption was substantially modified if not totally discarded.' Even
though the Virginia State Bar was acting as an administrative agency of
the Virginia Supreme Court, its issuing of advisory opinions holding that
fee schedules were enforceable was found not to fit within the state action
exemption of Parker v. Brown.'9' The Court, however, noted that the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court had neither endorsed nor adopted the opinions.101
92. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002 (1) & (3) (1975); BOWERS, note 85 supra, at 479.
93. See notes 2 & 3, supra.
94. See generally, Meeks, Antitrust Aspects of Prepaid Legal Services Plans, 1976 AM. B.
FOUNDATION RES. J. 855; Note, The Organized Bar and Prepaid Legal Services-An Antitrust
Analysis, 1975 WASH. U. L. Q. 1011; SYRACUSE NOTE, note 60 supra.
95. See notes 59-65 supra, and accompanying text.
96. EMMONS, note 27 supra at 250; BERNsTEiN & DEMENT, note 72 supra, at 74; ANTrrRusT
PROBLEMS, note 62 supra; TUNNEY SuscoMMrrra, note 64 supra.
97. See notes 66-71 supra, and accompanying text.
98. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
99. Id. at 782-83, 785.
100. Id. at 787-88.
101. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
102. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975). On the current status of
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In Bates v. Arizona State Bar,0 3 the Court unanimously held that the
Arizona Supreme Court's adoption of disciplinary rules prohibiting law-
yers from advertising was state action exempted from coverage of the anti-
trust laws."4 Thus, proscriptions imposed on legal services plans by the
Code of Professional Responsibility and state statutes are apparently not
governed by the antitrust laws and are therefore to be limited by federal
law statutorily preempting state regulation' and constitutionally protect-
ing certain activities."' This does not, however, mean that legal services
plans or other activity by the organized bar is protected from antitrust
laws. 1
One way the organized bar may come under Justice Department scru-
tiny could be if it sponsored an open panel plan which adopted a schedule
of maximum fees to be paid for the services offered by the plan. Such an
arrangement could be viewed as price fixing if prices in the particular
market were found to be affected.' This concern would be heightened
if the schedule were based on actuarial data gathered in an area, such as
Virginia, where bar association minimum fee schedules have been in ef-
fect.1
A non-bar sponsored plan might also be guilty of price fixing if it is
operated by a group of attorneys otherwise in competition with one another
that adopts a maximum fee schedule which affects prices in the market.
For example, in Blue Cross v. Commonwealth, "' a group of hospitals oper-
ated a prepaid drug plan through their agent, Blue Cross of Virginia. The
the advisory opinion process, see Surety Title Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar,
431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977) (Merhige, J.) (enjoining the defendant from issuing any
further opinions defining the practice of law in this case on the ground that such a practice
constituted a group boycott), vacated, 571 F. 2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978) (remanding the case with
orders to stay proceedings pending appellate review of a Norfolk Circuit Court unauthorized
practice action by the Commonwealth against the plaintiff in the federal case on the ground
that the State case would clarify the roles of the Virginia State Bar and the Virginia Supreme
Court in the disciplinary procedures).
On the impact of the Goldfarb case on the state action exemption, see Shenefield &
Hartwell, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments 1975-1976, 34 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 7,
21 (1977); Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments 1974-1975, 33 WAsH. & LEE
L. REv. 259, 289 (1976).
103. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
104. Id. at 2696-98. On the impact of this case on the state action exemption, see Carsten-
sen, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments 1976-1977, 35 WASH. & LEE L. Rsv. 1, 57
(1978).
105. See notes 77-93 supra.
106. See notes 26-34 & 39.49 supra.
107. See sources cited in note 94 supra.
108. SYRAcUsF NoTS, note 60 supra, at 764-66.
109. Id. at 767.
110. 211 Va. 180, 176 S.E. 2d 439 (1970), commented on in 12 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 676
(1971).
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plan adopted a repayment schedule whereby pharmacists selling prescrip-
tions to subscribers of the plan were reimbursed at cost plus a fixed
amount. The Virginia Supreme Court held that such a large supplier of
services as this group of hospitals could not fix the prices charged by
participating pharmacists."' It has been suggested that the way to avoid
this sort of problem is to eliminate provider control of pricing decisions.','
However, this will be somewhat difficult for a group of attorneys operating
a plan in corporate form because of the requirement that the majority of
the board of directors of such a corporation be providers of legal services."
While the foregoing discussion has been limited to price fixing, there are
other possible antitrust violations such as monopoly, boycott, and unfair
competition."'
While some uncertainty still surrounds the operation of legal services
plans, there are a good number of plans doing business. The Virginia State
Bar has been actively involved in this field since 1976 when the Foundation
for Prepaid Legal Services of Virginia was created.'15 The Foundation has
a program, administered and underwritten by the Midwest Mutual Insur-
ance Company, which offers both open and closed panel plans."'
Joseph R. Winston
111. SYRACUSE NOTE, note 60 supra, at 766-67; 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 676 (1971).
112. SYRACUSE NOTE, note 60 supra, at 767.
113. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-797 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
114. See sources cited in note 94 supra.
115. Report of the Committee on Prepaid Legal Services, printed in Sept. 1976 VA. B. NEWs
at 6.
116. Report of the Committee on Prepaid Legal Services, printed in May-June 1976 VA.
B. NEWS at 40. For further details see, March-April 1976 VA. B. NEws at 52.
In addition to marketing the program to unions, employers, and other organizations, the
Foundation and Midwest Mutual have recently received a grant from the National Legal
Services Corporation under which both open and closed panel services and indemnity plans
are being operated and studied as an alternative method of providing legal services to the
poor. March 1978 VA. B. NEws at 2.
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